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This article considers the relationship between transnationalism and social capital 
amongst young Pakistani Muslim women in Bradford. Due to their parents’ 
experience of migration and community-building, and unprecedented advances in 
modern telecommunications and media, the transnational is omnipresent in the 
everyday lives of second-generation migrants. We illustrate how they accrue faith-
based social capital to negotiate and resist transnationally gendered expectations, 
norms, values and practices. In particular, in several ways they use faith-based social 
capital that is transnationally informed: to challenge the patriarchal expectations and 
norms of their families; to gain access to higher/further education and thereby 
improve their life opportunities; and to overcome growing anti-Muslim sentiment.  
 




In January 2016, the UK Conservative government announced a new initiative for 
Muslim women to learn English, so they would become a moderating force and act as 
vocal opponents of radical Imams in their community. The initiative was seen as a 
response to concern amongst politicians and policy-makers that young Muslim men 
become radicalised because of ‘the traditional submissiveness of Muslim women’, as 
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Prime Minister David Cameron put it.1 The initiative came under intense criticism 
from Muslim women’s groups, who saw it as reproducing problematic narratives 
about Muslim women as passive, voiceless victims. They took to Twitter 
(♯traditionallysubmissive) to highlight their achievements, voice and agency.  
This was not the first time that Muslim women became objects of intervention at the 
behest of UK politicians. For the past decade or so, cultural practices of Muslim 
women, such as wearing the veil and transnational arranged/forced marriages, have 
been widely discussed and debated. As Razak (2008: 4) argues, ‘while Muslim men 
have been the target of an intense policing, Muslim women have been singled out as 
needing protection from their violent and hyper-patriarchal men’. At the same time, 
the British government has developed a strategy for Muslim women to advise 
ministers on matters relating to counter-terrorism and radicalization, because they are 
seen to embody a ‘safer’ and more ‘liberal’ Islam (Brown, 2008; AUTHORS, 2012). 
Indeed, women have been seen as a playing a vital role in the fight against extremism. 
 
The focus of this article is on exploring how young second-generation Pakistani 
Muslim women accrue faith-based social capital to negotiate transnational gendered 
expectations, norms, values and practices, whilst resisting growing discrimination and 
prejudice. The aim is to illustrate how young women are not passive, docile victims of 
patriarchal expectations and external hostilities; rather, they often confront such 
challenges by turning to their faith and using it to counter negative stereotypes and 
discrimination peacefully. At times, this is in sharp contrast to their male counterparts, 
                                                     
1 David Cameron (2016): “More Muslim women should ‘learn English’ to help tackle extremism”. The 
Telegraph, 17 January 2016. 
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some of whom have decided to tread the fine line between legal/illegal activities and 
radical Islam (Macey, 1999, 2002).2 
 
This article begins with a discussion of social capital and transnationalism, with a 
particular focus on gender and ethnic/religious forms of social capital. This is 
followed by a brief overview of Bradford, West Yorkshire, where empirical research 
was conducted among young Pakistani Muslims. Finally, the paper examines how 
young Muslim women use faith-based social capital to negotiate transnational 
expectations and practices. For example, we explore how some young women draw 
on faith-based social capital in order to progress to higher/further education. Often, 
Pakistani parents have deep cultural reservations about their daughters attending 
college or university, particularly as it takes them from under the private surveying 
gaze of the family. Also, amid growing anti-Muslim sentiment, young Muslim 
women are turning to faith-based social capital as a means of resistance and 
resilience.  
 
Gendering Social Capital and Transnationalism  
The concept of ‘social capital’ has empirical and theoretical utility for understanding 
how the creation of specific networks and relationships of trust and reciprocity can, 
inter alia, facilitate upward socio-economic mobility, contribute to community 
development, increase educational attainment, strengthen democracy and ensure 
community cohesion (Coleman, 1988, 1990; Bourdieu, 1986; Putnam, 1995, 2001).  
                                                     
2 It is, of course, important to mention that women often take up arms when they face constant threats 
to their ethnic, religious or political identities. In such cases, it is the threats rather than grievances 
rooted in gender that are foregrounded (such as women’s brigade within ISIS).  
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Feminists have focused on what a gendered analysis tells us about social capital, and 
the gender differences in the distribution, nature and mobilization of social capital. 
First, a gendered analysis of social capital illustrates how it is ‘imbued with gender 
inequalities and gendered hierarchies’ (Van Staveren, 2002: 22) which can potentially 
affect the accumulation and investment of social capital. Thus gender inequality can 
often translate into inequality in social capital and human capital that may contribute 
to existing social and economic inequalities. Second, there are significant differences 
in the social networks and embedded resources between women and men. Women’s 
networks are smaller, informal, more homogeneous (in respect of sex, age, education 
and income), and larger in terms of kin, and they belong to expressive or community 
based organisations. Generally men’s organisational experiences tend to be economic 
or recreational (Gidengil and O’Neill, 2006: 5, 264; Foley and Edwards, 1999: 146;; 
Lowndes 2006: 234; Moore, 1990: 727; Morrow, 2006). Third, the private sphere as a 
site for building social capital is neglected; and traditional institutions such as ‘the 
family’ are treated normatively, even though they are frequently sites of power and 
contestation (Gidengil and O’Neill, 2006; Lowndes, 2006; Morrow, 1999, 2001, 
2006). This can be attributed to the continued relevance of the public/private divide, 
which underestimates the relevance of the domestic economy for community 
development.  
 
Yet we would argue that it is problematic to assume that women’s social capital is 
less significant because of the structural disadvantages that they often encounter, 
relative to men. Often, women build and mobilise stocks of social capital away from 
the conventional gaze of the theorists, particularly within the home and local (ethnic 
and religious) community (Stolle and Micheletti, 2006; AUTHORS, 2010). Relatedly, 
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it would be incorrect to assume that all women have access to the same kind of social 
capital, as it is likely to be influenced by the intersectional axes of class, generation, 
race/ethnicity and religion.  
 
A largely US-based literature explores how various ethnic groups mobilise collective 
resources (family, kinship and community) to overcome particular disadvantages (e.g. 
Portes and Zhou, 1993; Zhou, 1992). Bankston and Zhou (2002: 286) examine 
‘ethnicity as a resource’ and define social capital ‘to not only include the resources 
held by individuals or groups but also as “processes” of social interaction leading to 
constructive outcomes’.3  The relationship between families and the community (local 
and transnational) is understood to be cyclical. The community is an important 
vehicle for reinforcing various norms, beliefs and values (e.g. education and hard 
work) transmitted by the family, and vice versa.  
 
Others have examined the role of religion or faith-based social capital, particularly in 
terms of how it can accrue physical resources and social networks (Furbey et al., 
2006; Smidt, 2003). Religious-based social capital has also been viewed suspiciously.  
Hopkins (2011: 530) warns that ‘[a]n unfortunate impediment to analysing faith 
identities and how they contribute to the production of social capital is a tendency to 
regard religion as irrational and as therefore inherently problematic’ – especially 
Islam and Muslims.  
 
                                                     
3 For example, overcoming limited human and economic capital among first-generation Vietnamese 
immigrants in the US is explained by the social capital of their ‘intact families’ (Bankston and Zhou, 
2002). 
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Social capital has also been used to explore contemporary processes of 
transnationalism, for example the emergence of transnational families that have been 
understood discursively, such as in a sense of de-territorialised solidarity between a 
group of strangers of ‘imagined communities’ (Anderson, 1983), or materially, 
whereby goods, funds and opportunities flow in and through transnational circuits 
(Kivisto, 2001). Contrary to the argument that mobility will deplete conventional 
stocks of social capital (Coleman, 1988), new forms of social capital are re-
established (Ballard, 2003; Goulbourne, 2002; Portes et al., 1999; Vertovec, 2001). 
Resources are mobilised through social networks to facilitate and sustain family 
relationships across national borders (Glick Schiller et al., 1992; Goulbourne and 
Chamberlain, 2001; Portes et al., 1999; Zontini, 2010). Social capital is pivotal in the 
decision to migrate, to facilitate settlement and the acquisition of information and 
resources in the new country, and can be readily mobilised within transnational family 
networks in times of need, for instance economic hardship (Ballard, 2003; Voigt-
Graf, 2004). Whilst immigrants are not tied to localised communities, kin and ethnic 
ties bound up in notions of trust, reciprocity and solidarity continue to play a central 
role in processes of migration and settlement. Landolt (2001: 217) describes how 
norms and practices come to exist through ‘circuits of transnational obligations and 
interests’.4  Often transnational marriage plays a key role in the processes described 
by Landolt (2001) and Vertovec (2004), especially in extending a family’s kinship 
network and collective upward mobility.  
 
                                                     
4 Similarly, Vertovec (2004: 17) highlights how: “[f]or many individuals, families and communities in 
both sending and receiving contexts, transnational patterns of everyday activity, communication and 
exchange become embedded in a kind of transnational moral economy of kin.”  
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In summary, people’s family lives increasingly transcend the nation state and involve 
the expectations and concerns of people living many miles away. Advancements in 
communications and technology, and their relative affordability, have meant that the 
world ‘out there’ and the ‘homeland’ (e.g. kin, faith/religion and ethnicity networks) 
are closer than ever before for transnational families. People’s everyday lives are 
conditioned in terms of expectations (e.g. work, education, marriage and life course), 
moral economy of kin (e.g. providing support and guidance to kin based on trust and 
reciprocity), and institutional structures (e.g. how to organise or participate in 
religious/ethnic community and local association). Significantly, it has meant that kin-
based networks, relationships of trust and reciprocity are more easily sustained across 
space, while gendered, religious and cultural expectations, norms, values and 
practices are transmitted inter-generationally.  
 
Bradford 
This article draws on empirical data collected in the city of Bradford, West Yorkshire, 
UK, where a number of national and international controversies have resulted in the 
increasing visibility of the Pakistani Muslim community. These include: the rise of 
right-wing politics during the 1970s and 1980s; the Honeyford affair (1980s) 
concerning the perceived racist remarks by a head teacher on the lack of social 
integration and an adherence to cultural, religious and ethnic identities amongst local 
Pakistanis; and publication of Salman Rushdie’s book, Satanic Verses, in 1998. The 
reaction of the Muslim community to the perceived blasphemous portrayal of revered 
Islamic figures started in Bradford, as were the urban disturbances of 1995 and 2001 
when, for the first time, the protagonists were predominantly young Pakistani Muslim 
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men (Burlet and Reid, 1998; Macey, 2002, 1999). Young women, for the most part, 
were not directly involved in these disturbances.  
 
We draw on in-depth interviews with young Pakistani Muslim men and women, 
conducted by the first author in four predominantly Pakistani Muslim neighbourhoods 
in Bradford’s inner city (Manningham, Girlington, Heaton-Oak Lane, and West 
Bowling) (McLoughlin, 2006).  During July 2004 and May 2005, a total of 54 
interviews were conducted: 29 female, 25 male. The British-born respondents were 
aged between 16 and 20 years of age and were recruited from schools, youth clubs, 
the university and colleges. All the interviews were recorded, transcribed, coded and 
analysed using Atlas-ti software, in a grounded theory approach. We used 
pseudonyms to protect the anonymity of our respondents (for an in-depth 
methodological discussion, see AUTHORS, 2008). In this article, we only focus on 
women as our data supports and builds on growing body of literature that illustrates 
how Muslim immigrant women are exercising agency through reclaiming their 
religious traditions through embodied and knowledge-based piety (Amir-Moazami 
and Salvatore, 2003; Jouili and Amir-Moazami, 2006). 
 
Young Women – Change and Resistance 
The young women in our research talked about how the migratory and transnational 
experiences and practices of their parents informed their relationships with them, with 
their family in Pakistan, and with the larger society.5  Parents often relied upon 
narratives of their ‘loss’, ‘sacrifice’ and ‘hardship’ when they arrived in the UK in 
                                                     
5 According to Yeoh et al. (2005: 308): “[t]he transnational family as a formation derives its lived 
reality not only from material bonds of collective welfare among physically dispersed members but 
also a shared imaginary of ‘belonging’, which transcends particular periods and places to encompass 
past trajectories and future continuities.”  
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order to instil particular norms and values in young people (e.g. the need to respect 
their elders, and arranged marriage to first cousins). This explained how and why 
gendered expectations were often reproduced inter-generationally. Young women 
were expected to take on the traditional role as a dutiful wife, daughter-in-law and 
mother. Family honour (izzat), which is closely tied to patrilineal decent group 
(biraderi), remained a central tenet of transnational families. Young women, in 
particular, were expected to respect and adhere to it. Failure to do so often resulted in 
being shunned by the family and community, forced into an arranged marriage or, in 
some extreme cases, subjected to violence and even murder (i.e. honour-based-
violence) (Werbner, 2007; Meetoo and Mirza, 2007).6 
 
Our research found that young women demonstrated agency via a religious rather 
than ethnic identity because they saw religion to be more empowering than their 
culture and cultural identity. Rather than being a source of oppression and exclusion 
(Hopkins, 2011), religion for these women was a resource to be mobilised against 
what Ali (1992: 115) describes as a ‘northern conservatism’ in northern English cities, 
where an overbearing Pakistani patriarchal masculine culture suppresses Pakistani 
women. Unlike some of their male counterparts who were associated with deviant 
masculinities, the disturbances, ‘gang culture’, underachievement (e.g. education and 
economic) (Macey, 1999, 2002), young women used their faith identity to negotiate, 
challenge and transform transnational gendered norms and expectations, on the one 
hand and, on the other, to counter growing anti-Muslim hostility. Indeed, ‘religious 
                                                     
6 Recently, Naz Shah (2016), Minister of Parliament for Bradford West, which includes Manningham, 
reiterated, ‘we do have patriarchal pockets in our communities which won’t and don’t support women 
going out and being confident and partaking in civil society because they want that patriarchal structure 
to continue’. The Guardian, 18 January 2016. 
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cultural capital’ (Ramji, 2007: 1181) became an important tool for personal 
betterment, particularly through education, for many young Muslim women.  
 
The respondents built this religious capital with like-minded women (and men) whom 
they met at Islamic conferences, book readings, prayer sessions or 
school/college/university.  For many of the young women, such networks and 
associations constituted a religious community that provided ‘safe spaces’ where they 
could share their ideas and learn more about their faith. Indeed, it was an outlet where 
they could air their frustrations and seek solace. Often such interactions took place at 
university or college and in Muslim associations. The respondents also arranged 
Qur’an reading sessions and social evenings where they would discuss their faith in 
greater detail. They also discussed more contentious issues such as the media and 
political demonization of Islam, and how they ought to respond to this as individuals. 
Many held the view that they each had a responsibility not to besmirch Islam through 
their daily interactions with non-Muslims, even in the face of growing hostility.   
 
Transnational linkages were also established via particular chat-rooms on the Internet 
and/or sharing their ideas about their personal faith journey with Islamic bloggers.  
This community was seen to be more progressive and valuable in, for example, 
emphasising the Islamic perspective about the importance of education as a counter to 
ignorance. It was both a source of inspiration and support for many of the young 
women in negotiating and challenging transnational cultural practices whilst bringing 
about positive change in Bradford.  
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Thus, women drew on religion to develop strategies to challenge their families’ 
cultural expectations and practices. Central to the women’s strategy was the de-
coupling of faith from cultural beliefs and practices. These women were often critical 
of the fact that their parents had a limited or very literal understanding of the Islam, 
and were therefore ignorant about how, for example, certain traditional cultural 
practices were understood to be religiously upheld, even though the two may have 
opposing perspectives or no position on the matter whatsoever. An example was 
higher or further education and careers for women. Many young women reiterated the 
value of education from a religious perspective. For example, one female respondent, 
Sara (aged 17), talked about how education and educating oneself is absolutely central 
to Islam: 
What I have learnt from my religion is that you need to educate 
yourself if you want to achieve anything. What I found is that people 
who are more religious have gone further in education so there is a 
kind of correlation between people’s religious kind of spirituality 
and their achievement.7 
 
Often, gaining access to higher/further education entailed building relationships of 
trust with parents. Young women were critical of how their parents still held onto 
gendered expectations about female education that were no longer relevant in 
Pakistan. Indeed, there was a sense that their parents were out of touch with the 
changes that had taken place in Pakistan and they were holding onto an image that no 
longer existed. They were also critical of how their parents’ judgement was always 
informed by worst-case scenarios (e.g. that the daughter would elope or be enticed 
                                                     
7 Interview conducted on July 20, 2004. 
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into Western ways such as drinking and smoking, and bring shame and dishonour to 
the family). Indeed, whilst many parents appreciated the importance of education, 
they often opposed the values that education promoted, such as individuality, 
freedom, and greater autonomy. A number of female respondents spoke anecdotally 
about female friends being removed by their parents from compulsory education just 
before they were about to sit for their final exams and taken back to Pakistan to be 
married. In some instances, this went against the key goal of transnational family 
strategy to enhance ‘social, cultural and symbolic capital’ through education (Waters, 
2005; Yeoh et al., 2005: 312).  
 
One way in which some of the women sought to build this trust was by demonstrating 
and performing their religion more obviously, for example wearing the hijab 
(headscarf), which then counterpoised them with their supposedly less religious, non-
hijab wearing female counterparts, who were looked upon with greater suspicion by 
parents when out in public away from the scrutiny of their family. Similarly, Ali 
(1992: 114) comments that ‘the good Muslim girl who shows unusual devotion to her 
faith may find it possible to express a desire for higher education or professional 
employment without risking her position’. Sara, the respondent whom we mentioned 
earlier, was considered very religious by her parents because she wore the hijab, 
prayed five times a day and was planning a pilgrimage to Mecca. In discussing how 
cultural practices within the community can be barriers to women’s educational 
aspirations, Sara said: 
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I think that as long as it is Islamically okay to do a certain thing, 
even if the whole community was against it, I will do it because the 
community is not always right.8  
 
Sara’s close friend, Laila (aged 17), spoke about the importance of faith and 
education, and the cultural burdens of patriarchy: 
 
Learning that knowledge is light [...] comes from faith. I would like 
to clarify that in terms of an Islamic point of view, you get a country 
like Afghanistan where women are not being educated which is not 
Islamic at all. I would class [i.e. categorise] that and see that as 
patriarchy and that it is totally cultural.9 
 
Faith-based social capital also served another purpose. In the face of growing anti-
Muslim sentiment, the young women relied on their faith-based networks for support. 
The fear of anti-Muslim reprisals after 9/11 had deep reverberations within Muslim 
communities. For instance, Nabila (aged 17) talked about the growing hostility 
towards Muslims since 9/11 and her frustration in challenging it: 
 
It’s giving them [Muslims] a bad name case even if he [Osama Bin 
Laden and al-Qaeda] for the good or something, he’s done it for the 
worse because it’s gone off [backfired] on us and not him. I didn’t 
                                                     
8 Interview conducted on July 20, 2004.  
9 Interview conducted on August 6, 2005. 
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tell him to go and do it [attack the Twin towers in New York], it’s 
not my fault I’m Muslim, it’s just him and his own fault.10  
 
 A common theme that we encountered during the research was the question of 
whether women should wear the hijab, particularly as it made it easier for the women 
to be singled out as Muslim and thus a target of discrimination and prejudice. For 
example, Sara said: 
I think it’s [hostility towards Muslims] getting worse... because of 
the media... and you have got the BNP [far-right British National 
Party] kicking in as well... now my clothing [referring to her hijab] 
...I get asked questions and funny looks that maybe I wouldn’t have 
got three or five years back... things are not working for Muslims in 
the media and in politics... now it’s heightened [hostility towards 
Muslims], it’s working more against Muslims.11 
 
In discussing how Islam influences her life and the significance of wearing a hijab, 
Iffat (age 19) stated that ‘it’s like identification, that, “Ok, I’m Muslim” – you feel 
protected’. Many of the women gained support from their networks when they 
encountered hostility for wearing the hijab or for being Muslim. For example, Anika 
(aged 18) discussed how: 
  
For me and my friends wearing the hijab means that we identify with each 
other... we’re sisters and support one another... when you face trouble, you 
know, like racism, abuse, being called names... Just being with likeminded  
                                                     
10 Interview conducted on September 7, 2005. 
11 Interview conducted on September 8, 2005. 
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people, people who understand and share what you believe in [i.e. faith] and 
experience helps lots.12 
 
 Indeed, it was often because of this support network that women were able to 
encourage other women who were unsure about the responses that they may 
encounter when they decided to wear the hijab. But wearing the hijab also marked 
people as different, as ‘Outsiders’, and with suspicion. In recalling a trip to Italy in 
2004, Iffat (age 19) discussed how ‘times have changed’ and that Muslims and Islam 
have become ‘public enemy number one’. Iffat and her sister were stopped by 
policemen because as she says,  
I was wearing a headscarf and they asked, ‘Where are your 
documents?’ They just said it to me, not my sister because she 
doesn’t wear a scarf, so I was like, ‘We’re British, we’re from 
Britain’, he then just shut up and walked off.13 
 
In this case, Iffat was aware of the potential problems associated with her faith 
identity and instead chose to foreground her national identity. Parents were often less 
religious than their daughters and had reservations about their wearing the hijab: 
 
My mother because of all this terrorism she was watching on the 
news, she said, ‘Iffat I fear for your life so take it off’...and my 
father would say, ‘Oh there’s no need to wear it, it’s ok you know.14 
 
                                                     
12 Interview conducted on August 16, 2005. 
13 Interview conducted on October 5, 2005. 
14 Interview conducted on October 7, 2005. 
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Despite these concerns, many young women decided to keep wearing the hijab. 
Indeed, the strength and resilience to continue wearing the hijab came from the 
women who were also wearing one. 
 
Conclusion 
Transnationalism alerts us to the fact the lives of migrants are not tied to any one 
nation-state. Rather people have multiple layered affinities and identities – to places, 
spaces, peoples, cultures, religions, and traditions near and afar. Such transnational 
relationships have become increasingly problematized recently. Concerns with the 
supposed helplessness and lack of agency of Pakistani women in the face of an overly 
burdensome transnational patriarchal culture has become a key focus in political and 
policy circles in the UK, particularly in terms of how it links with the securitisation 
(i.e. anti-terror) agenda. This article problematises these stereotypes by examining the 
ways in which young women navigate their everyday transnational lives in Bradford. 
Whilst young women are expected to adhere to transnational patriarchal expectations, 
values and practices, women resist by developing coping strategies that centre on 
faith-based social capital – faith is a resource. They understand ‘being Muslim’ as a 
source of strength, solace, and security in terms of negotiating (albeit subtly), on the 
one hand, relations and structures of power within their own communities and, on the 
other hand, increasing discrimination and hostility externally.   
 
Overall, we illustrate how unequal gendered power relations do not undermine the 
capacity to build social capital − including faith-based capital. Instead, we have 
argued that faith based capital is mobilized by women to: negotiate both the public 
and the private; advance educationally; and challenge the misconceptions of the 
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supposed incompatibility between gender equality and Islam. Despite experiencing 
‘northern conservatism’ and patriarchy within predominantly the private sphere and 
Islamophobia in the public sphere, young women mobilized faith-based capital to 
negotiate these obstacles. 
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